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Hungary was trying to distance itself from the Soviet Union’s sphere of interest 
even in the period that preceded the regime change and sought opportunities 
to loosen the tight bonds of earlier dependence. One such opportunity was the 
participation in the various peace support operations organized by the UN. 
Primarily experts of the Hungarian Defence Force and the Police participated 
in them. This essay presents the first Hungarian undertaking in Africa (Angola) 
which laid the foundation for Hungary’s participation in further peace operations.
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Antecedents, the Angolan civil war:
As I was preparing this essay I found that the written record (primarily the holdings of 
the official archives) is very incomplete, therefore I also relied on the recollections of 
the retired soldiers who had served previously in Angola. Before I address the subject, 
it will be necessary to discuss the process that led to the UN operation in Angola.
Portuguese colonialism differed in many ways from German, French, Belgian, English 
or Dutch, in that Portugal did not take over and exploit the resources but tried to 
build a new Portugal in Angola (Chabal and Vidal, 2007, 4). To a certain extent we 
can consider this a positive effect, because today’s cities and industrial infrastructure 
all originated in the Portuguese era. However, the treatment of the native population, 
was similar to that in the colonies of the other nations. Although Angola was called an 
overseas province in the 1950s when some small reforms were started, the previous 
policy of Portugal changed but little. This attitude implicitly resulted in strengthening 
the independence groups that were organized ethnically and territorially, and led to the 
escalation of violence (Besenyő, 2013, 287). The struggle for Angolan independence 
lasted nearly fifteen years. Finally the army confronted the regime and eliminated the 
previous Portuguese colonial policy when it precipitated the “Carnation Revolution” 
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on April 25, 1974. As a result Portugal withdrew from Bissau-Guinea, Mozambique, 
Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe as well as Angola in 1975.
After the elimination of colonial rule the various liberation movements soon confronted 
each other; however they tried to give an ideological justification to their conflict 
(Hodges, 2001, 7-9). “Unselfish help” soon appeared in the conflict. The superpowers 
of the bipolar world contributed indirectly to the continuation of the civil war for 
years. Cuban troops marched in to support the central government established in 
Luanda by the MPLA. 1 At the same time the United States (USA), Zaire 2 and South 
Africa undertook the support of UNITA 3, the insurgent government and army led by 
Dr. Jonas Savimbi in the other parts of the country (Chabal and Vidal, 2007, 100). 
This soon led to the division of Angola and contributed significantly to the outbreak 
of a bloody civil war that lasted more than a decade. In this war the opposite sites 
fought with varying success, but even with external help neither side proved to be 
capable of prevailing over the other. The conflict came to a stalemate at the end of 
the 1980s. MPLA and UNITA tried to achieve a military victory, but the battle of 
Cuito Cuanavale (between November 1987 and March 1988) resulted in a standoff. 
It became clear to military strategists and politicians that the conflict could not be 
solved by with military force, and they began negotiations (Búr, 2011, 171-172).
Finally Angola, the United States, the Soviet Union, Cuba and South Africa came to 
an agreement in New York on 22 December 1988, as a result of mediation by the 
United Nations (UN). The South African and Cuban troops were withdrawn from 
Angola according to New York Agreement (Besenyő, 2013/3, 303). The concerned 
parties signed a peace agreement in Bicesse (Portugal) in 1991 with the support 
of the “Troika” (USA, Russia, Portugal), and entrusted its supervision to the UN 
(James and Broadhead, 2004, 19-20). The peace-agreement prescribed open and 
free elections and the establishment of a national army after both UNITA’s and 
the government’s forces were disbanded. The parties agreed that the “unemployed” 
soldiers of the opposing forces would be integrated in the national army. 4
The United Nations Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I) was deployed 
between January 1989 and May 1991 to enforce the peace agreement. This was 
the first peace-operation on the African continent since the UN’s operation in 
Congo (ONUC – United Nations Operation in the Congo) in the 1960s.The UN 
had to deploy three further operations 5 in the country due to friction between 
the opposing sides and the frequent clashes between armed groups. Despite 
1 Movimento Popular para a Libertaçao de Angola (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola)
2 Today it known as Democratic Republic of the Congo.
3 União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola). South 
Africa not only “supported” UNITA but it was also active belligerent. Its forces were smaller than those of Cuba, 
but it provided significant numbers of troops, artillery, armour and air support.
4 http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unavem1/UnavemIB.htm (Downloaded: 30. 09. 2014.)
5 UNAVEM II, UNAVEM III. and MONUA
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difficulties, the leaders of the country and UNAVEM found the circumstances 
adequate for holding free and fair elections where Angolans could decide who 
would get their mandate to lead the country.
The elections were held on September 29–30, 1992; according to official figures 91 
percent of the eligible voters (4.82 million) participated. 6 Jose Eduardo dos Santos 
got the 49.6 percent of votes while Dr. Jonas Savimbi got 40.07 percent (Hodges, 
2001, 14). The MPLA also won the parliamentary elections, with 53.74 percent of 
the votes, while UNITA won 34.10 percent. So MPLA could delegate 129 repre-
sentatives while UNITA could send 70 to the National Assembly. Ten other parties 
got altogether 21 seats. As a consequence of the polls, Dr. Jonas Savimbi called 
back his generals from the National Army and begun an extraordinarily powerful 
offensive that resulted the occupation of two thirds of the country (Chabal and Vidal, 
2007, 139-145). Speaking of these events, Margaret Anstee (the representative of the 
Secretary General) said that the international community was not showing sufficient 
interest in solving Angola’s troubles, and consequently Angola became “an Orphan 
of the Cold War”. It was becoming clear for UNAVEM that the few hundred UN 
observers could not disarm a 150.000 member armed force.
When the Lusaka Agreement was signed in 1994, the UN was willing to finance 
the expansion of UNAVEM-II’s strength from a few hundred to eight thousand 
and start the UNAVEM-III operation with a stronger mandate, as a result of the 
lesson learned from the previous failures. They presumed on Lusaka Agreement 
although Savimbi was not willing to sign it. Finally the USA established diplomatic 
relations with Luanda in May 1993 when it saw the incomprehensible obstinacy 
of its previous ally. As a response, the Luanda government announced that it was 
introducing a market economy.
Since the war had devastated the country, the government requested financial 
support from the international community. Except for food deliveries and invest-
ments in the oil industry, such support was not forthcoming. However, the main 
problem was that the USA was not bringing pressure on UNITA’s armed forces. 
On the contrary, it continued to support UNITA financially, due to the incite-
ment of observers of “Troika”, controlling the adaptation of Lusaka Agreement 
protocols, and UN. Moreover, they demanded that the government guarantee a 
special status for Jonas Savimbi. Despite all of these, the opposing sides could 
not agree and hostilities were renewed (Hodges, 2001, 19).
6 http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/Unavem2/UnavemIIB.htm (Downloaded: 30. 09. 2014.)
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Hungary latch on to Angolan settlement:
Hungary closely monitored the Angolan settlement from the end of 1980s, as the 
report (dated September 8, 1988) of Lieutenant General Ferenc Szűcs, chief of the 
Hungarian People’s Army General Staff’s 2nd Directorate, to Lieutenant General 
József Pacsek shows. 7 The very detailed report floated the possibility of Hungarian 
investment in the settlement, but it rather emphasized the difficulties. A further three 
years had to pass before Hungarian participation in the Angolan settlement was again 
considered seriously. The first Angolan mission Hungarian soldiers participated in was 
UNAVEM-II. They also participated in the subsequent UNAVEM-III and MONUA 8 
operations. 9 Ten soldiers and a 15-member police contingent represented Hungary in 
UNAVEM-II and UNAVEM-III at the request of the UN. In addition, a three-member 
military and an eight-member police contingent participated in the MONUA mission. 
10 Previously the Hungarian police (Hungarian National Archives, XIX-J-1-j, Angola, 
1990, 00377 Hungarian participation in UNTAG) 11 and the Hungarian People’s Army 
had established good relations with the leadership of the MPLA, the Angolan Army 
and the other armed services of the government. Several Angolan officers attended the 
various higher education institutions of the Hungarian military for years (Hungarian 
National Archives, XIX-J-1-j, Angola, 1988, 00668 Angolan-Hungarian military edu-
cation agreement plan). For instance, thirty officers and twenty-five warrant officers of 
the Angolan Army’s active component took part in armor, mechanized infantry, radar 
technician, logistics, signals, and finance courses during the 1988/1989 academic year 
(Hungarian National Archives, XIX-J-1-j, Angola, 1988, 003961 Angolan-Hungarian 
military education agreement). Moreover, Hungary provided components to the An-
golan Army’s military vehicles (Hungarian National Archives, XIX-J-1-j, Angola, 
1990, 001056 Angolan to buy weapons from Hungary, and XIX-J-1-j, Angola, 1990, 
00541 Angola buys weapons from Hungary) and the Hungarian embassy oversaw 
various diplomatic, economic and cultural projects. 12  In its evaluation in the 1990s 
7  The report includes general information about the country, the military situation and the chances of political 
settlement. The number of the report is 79/19
8   United Nations Observer Mission In Angola
9   http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/Monua/monuab.htm (Downloaded: 30. 09. 2014.)
10 I could not ascertain the exact number of Hungarian soldiers who served in Angola. According to my information 
there could have been about 70 individuals. There were many gaps in the record of the African missions of the 
Hungarian Defense Forces, due to frequent realignments and reorganisation. Therefore I supplemented the sparse 
archival record with my interviews with individuals who had served on the African continent.
11 The Hungarian Police had been training Angolan policemen for years in Hungary. However, the Hungarian 
Ministry of Interior ceased these courses because the Angolan government failed to pay the expenses for several 
years’ courses. 
12 However, these relations eroded somewhat at the time of regime change in Hungary, because the Hungarian 
government was not willing to provide supplies on credit. Otherwise, annual Hungarian export was 5–6 million 
US dollars. While the other socialist countries strove to strengthen their extant positions in expectation of a 
peace treaty, Hungary closed its commercial bureau in Luanda and gradually reduced its extant interests, instead 
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the Ministry of Foreign Affairs rated Angola as a “relation with an emphasized role 
in our middle- and long-term plans”. The evaluation continues with “We consider it 
necessary to keep abreast of the changes in the country’s internal situation as well 
as of the emerging new political forces and the opinions of the representatives of 
other interested countries in the future.” (Hungarian National Archives, XIX-J-1-j, 
Angola, 1990, 0030 Angolan-Hungarian cooperation and future plan) According to 
another report Angola had played and would continue to play a significant political 
and economic role in the South African region, therefore Hungary would have to 
strengthen its participation to gain economic advantages in the future as well as it 
had to try after continuous presence (Hungarian National Archives, XIX-J-1-j, Angola, 
1990, 002492 Hungarian Embassy annual report from Angola). Understandably, the 
military (Hungarian National Archives, XIX-J-1-j, Namibia, 1988, 003777 Hungarian 
participation in UNTAG) 13 and political leadership maintained working relationships 
and had up-to-date information about Angola and the processes in the region when 
the idea of the Hungarian participation in UN’s Angolan mission was suggested. 
The positive decision was facilitated by the supporting attitude of the ruling Angolan 
leadership as well as by UNITA’s (Hungarian National Archives, XIX-J-1-j, Angola, 
1991, 002042 Meeting with UNITA representatives, and XIX-J-1-j, Angola, 1991, 
001673 Report on Hungarian-UNITA relationship) 14 willingness to accept Hungarian 
peace-keepers in the newly established UN peace operation (Hungarian National 
Archives, XIX-J-1-j, Angola, 1990, 00541 Angola buys weapons from Hungary, and 
XIX-J-1-j, Angola, 1991, 002083 Annual report of Hungarian Ambassador to Angola). 
Finally the Hungarian leadership declared that the country would participate in the 
Angolan settlement with a fifteen-member military group to fulfill the UN’s request 
(Hungarian National Archives, XIX-J-1-j, Angola, 1991, 0041 Hungarian participation 
in the Angolan settlement process). 15
of strengthening its positions. The Angolans had even offered opportunities for Hungarian companies in the 
exploitation of oilfields in Cabinda as well as in the restoration of the country. Hungarian National Archives, 
XIX-J-1-j, Angola, 1990, 00379 Angolan – Hungarian economic ties, Hungarian National Archives, XIX-J-1-j, 
Angola, 1990, 00381 Angolan – Hungarian economic ties, and , XIX-J-1-j, Angola, 1990, 001844 Hungarian 
economic delegation visit Angola
13 The Hungarian military leadership kept tabs on UN peace-operations in Africa since 1988 and it also planned 
on contributing a larger contingent to the Namibian operation. Eventually it was not soldiers but policemen who 
went to Namibia. However, the leadership of the Hungarian People’s Army and subsequently the Hungarian 
Defense Force prepared for more possible African operations. 
14 The Hungarian Government made contact with Jonas Malheiro due to Portuguese and South African intercessions 
during 1990–1991. The opposition leader of the Angolan Socialist Government also supported the participation of 
Hungarian peace-keepers in the UNAVEM operation. 
15 In addition to the peacekeeper contingent the UN also planned to rent or buy Hungarian helicopters for its Angolan 
operations. However the Hungarian Chief of Staff rejected the tender of the Canadian Skylink Company due to its 
unfavorable conditions. 
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Selection, preparation at home:
The selection of the first Angolan contingent was conducted at the General Staff’s 
Chief Directorate of Operations by the staff of the International Workgroup. 16 
In the spring of 1991 the Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Lász-
ló Borsits informed the commander of the Directorate, Major General József 
Bíró, that a political decision had been made that the Hungarian Defence Force 
(HDF) would send an observe contingent of 15 officers to Angola. He also 
directed the commander to select and prepare the contingent so that it would 
be ready to deploy within two weeks. Colonel László Hajdú was selected to 
execute the task. With the help of Human Resources Directorate of the HDF 
the Colonel and his staff identified the potential candidates for the mission. 17 
Ninety-four individuals (excluding the officers of the Military Reconnaissance 
Office) were identified as having passed intermediate or superior level English 
proficiency tests. Colonel Hajdú personally tested the applicants’ knowledge of 
English through a short conversation and a special translator task. 18  Preparation 
was conducted at the Hűvösvölgy institution of the Defense Ministry, with the 
assistance of the Center and experts. Several members of the HDF had served 
in the Iraq–Iranian UNIMOG mission between 1988 and 1991, so they had 
serious experience in peace operations in actual circumstances. Despite all that, 
the two weeks were too short for selection, preparation, medical examination, 
equipment issue, administration and other tasks. 19
The preparation of the second rotation was conducted by the Training Center of 
Peacekeeping Forces, which had been established Colonel Hajdú’s suggestion, 
to eliminate the deficiencies that had been encountered during the preparation 
and training of the first contingent. The team was placed in Budapest in an 
institution on Tünde Street and General János Deák, Chief of the General Staff 
16 The International Workgroup managed the execution of the Conventional Forces Europe (CFE), Open Skies, 
Vienna Document treaties and UN matters. At that time CFE programs were the most frequent because local 
inspections and arms cuts started after the promulgation of the agreement. Among the tasks of the Workgroup 
was to prepare the 57 Hungarian declared sites (military installations) for inspection. This proved to be a serious 
challenge, because the Hungarian Defense Force had never performed such tasks in the past.
17 Participation of Hungarian Defense Force personnel in foreign deployments was strictly voluntary. This applied 
to the Angola mission as well. The applicants had to get through a very serious professional and medical scre-
ening and a language test. That was the reason for the occasional shortage of eligible applicants, although over 
the number of applications exceeded the available mission billets. As a result several individuals extended their 
external service or were sent on new missions after a short time.
18 Personal interview with Colonel (retired) László Hajdú in September 2011.
19 The contingent did not deploy within the planned two weeks, after all. The configuration of the mission’s infrastructure 
worked more slowly than previously planned. The initial group of five officers travelled to the operational zone after a 
delay of several weeks, under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel László Török with. Some weeks later the remaining 
ten officers followed them.
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appointed Lieutenant Colonel Zoltán Horváth, then commander of the 52nd 
Repair Division, as its commander. Lieutenant Colonel Horváth was chosen 
because he was an experienced troop commander as well as he was member of 
retractable controlling staff of Disarming Information and Controlling Center. 20 
However, the organization was fugitive and the missionary preparations were 
executed by the Operation Coordination Center after its windup.
Although the preparation of the first group differed from that of the subsequent 
rotations, a permanent feature was that as the first step every applicant had to 
prove his proficiency in English through an examination that nowadays seems too 
demanding. 21 Several applicants failed because not many regular officers have an 
adequate command of English. So sending enough English speaking peacekeepers 
to Angola proved to be a serious challenge. That is why both the military and the 
police often “drafted” diplomats from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and gave 
them military/police ranks for the duration of their deployment (Besenyő, 213/a, 
271). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs delegated three individuals for the first rota-
tion. In order to avoid these necessary “drafts” the HDF organized English courses 
in many garrisons (e.g. Budapest, Debrecen) to have sufficient number of English 
speaking soldiers for the Angola mission (Besenyő, 213/a, 240, 270 and 286). The 
UN representatives were also aware of these problems. Due to previous negative 
experience, the first test after the arrival of Hungarian peacekeepers in the area of 
operations was a language test. The UN tested for its own language requirements 
that were more practical than literary. Due to this, many people could get over the 
difficulties after several attempts. In the beginning most Hungarians did not know 
that “every nation speaks English with their own language.” There were certain 
special phrases pronounced in a particular manner that were unintelligible even for 
native speakers of English (Besenyő, 2010, 134-143). The utility of the intensive 
language preparation/screening was that there was no difference in communication 
ability between the commandeered strength and the other countries’ strength with 
few missionary experiences.
Language testing was followed by physical examination. Although the military 
physicians had considerable tropical experience, 22 the leaders of the Hungarian 
medical system could not decide what the most important physical priorities 
20 http://hnykszabadszallas.5mp.eu/web.php?a=hnykszabadszallas&o=Xx6rGZx7yn (Downloaded: 25. 06. 2014.)
21 According to one peacekeeper, subjecting the participants to the (sometimes quite complicated) proficiency 
examination was totally useless for the Angolan operation. In his experience knowledge of everyday English 
was needed, not the literary niceties. It could be more useful to compose reports using the templates the UN 
provided to help the observers’ work, and training in radio transmission procedures in English (that proved to be 
the biggest challenge) was needed.
22 Nearly 600 Hungarians (mainly officers and in a smaller proportion diplomats) served in South Vietnam 
in tropical conditions between 1973 and 1975. The Hungarian military medical corps still had the valuable 
experience, collected there.
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were. Since they did not want to commit a fatal error, they had all of the 
possible tests done on the deploying troops. There was a very serious physical 
and mental condition evaluation before the health and sanitation training took 
place. According to the opinion of those who served abroad the information 
provided by the physicians conducting the training, was not always correct 
or useful. The main problem was that the rules and regulations prescribed at 
home could not be put into practice during the execution of peace-operations in 
the operational area. For instance, the peacekeeper could not refuse a friendly 
handshake even if the proffered hand was covered with several months’ mange, 
or refuse food of unknown origin prepared by this hand. It was impossible 
not to touch bacteria infected fresh-water when a vehicle was stuck in a river. 
It was impossible to investigate the circumstances of a clash without grazing 
anything, particularly if the peacekeepers appointed to execute the survey, were 
not issued wearing rubber gloves. 23 The Hungarian peacekeepers developed 
their own methods once these things became clear. One officer used his left 
hand for his own personal affairs (eat, drink, scratch, urinate, defecate etc.), 
and “lived his social life” with his right hand. Then he sterilized himself as 
circumstances allowed when he returned to his workplace. Food of unknown 
origin made daily “inner sterilization” necessary. For this purpose half deciliter 
(not more) spirit served perfectly.
The really positive aspect of the health and sanitation preparation was the 
vaccinations. This elevated the Hungarians over the other nations because 
they did not need the UN’s supplementary vaccinations. For example Lariam 
(for the prevention of malaria) was considered the most modern medication 
available. One thing that was not known at home – due to the lack of tropical 
experience – was how long this product could be used without irreversible 
damage of the liver. Then the deploying personnel were briefed that they had 
to start taking it one week prior to departure and stop taking it one week after 
their arrival at home. According to the doctor of the Portuguese hospital in the 
operational area, the maximum period was six months. When the personnel 
returned from the mission, the doctor conducting the returnees’ screening at 
home was also shocked that our officers took the medicine continuously for 
23 This problem was not unique to Angola. I remember when one member of the Hungarian contingent was on patrol 
with his African comrade in Western Sahara in 2003. Their vehicle hit a mine and turned over. The African officer 
was injured and bled profusely, so the Hungarian officer administered first aid. He had to apply the bandage with 
a bare hand because there was no rubber glove in the first aid package. Shortly afterwards it was learned that the 
African officer was infected by HIV so, he was returned to his country. The Hungarian officer had to wait for eight 
weeks for the immediate tests to have sure results. This period must have been hell for him. He lost more than 
twelve kilograms due to anxiety. Fortunately he was not infected. However as this case shows, medical regulations, 
prescribed at home, cannot be observed in the operational area on every occasion.
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more than a year. Despite this we can emphasize that the Hungarians ascer-
tained the medical fitness of the personnel and prepared them to the highest 
standard, considering the knowledge and experience available in Hungary.
The first contingent’s preparation was on an “ad hoc” basis, because there were 
no soldiers yet with African experience. So the material for the first Angola 
contingent’s preparation was compiled by experts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
as well as soldiers who gained their experiences in the UN’s Iraq–Iranian peace-
-operation (UNIMOG). The advice of those with Iraqi experience - even if they 
had not served in a tropical environment - was an invaluable help to soldiers with 
only minimum information about UN managed missions. In fact, at that time the 
HDF did not yet have any equipment used by the UN. The training team tried to 
familiarize the personnel with such equipment (transportation, water-purification, 
communication etc.) as could prove useful in practice. The Hungarian leadership 
soon got the first answers to the question of the efficiency of the training and 
preparation, because the first contingent left for the operational area on 15 July 
1991 (Four Years of Defense, 1990-1994, 29). 
Two foreign-area experts with provisional military rank, who had participated in 
the preparation of the contingent, also travelled with the first rotation because 
they had served previously in Angola. Their local connections as well as their 
experience helped the team’s work a great deal (Besenyő, et al, 2013, 106 and 
123). On arrival the soldiers participated in some mission-specific training in the 
field, organized by the UN. It turned out that although there were shortcomings 
in the preparations they received at home, the Hungarians still belonged among 
the best prepared (Besenyő, 2013/a, 271). Despite this, there was an effort made 
to eliminate the shortcomings in the training program for the second rotation.
Officers who had returned home from Angola in the interim served as instructors the 
second group’s training program which was carried out by the recently established 
HDF Peace-force Training Center (Four Years of Defense, 1990-1994, 183-185). 
These officers tried to hand down as much of their experience as possible to the 
new contingent (Besenyő, 2013/a, 241). They emphasized those ordinary mission 
tasks that they had had to deal with regularly (controlling the cease-fire, separating 
armed groups, disarmament as well as organizing elections). 
By this time the HDF’s organization for peace-keeping had evolved into the 
structure that still functions today, albeit with some changes. Of course, the 
briefings conducted by the returned officers were not always useful, because 
Angola was divided into six regions, in which forty camps were operating 
with different specifics and in varying circumstances. The member of the 
small Hungarian contingent were not present in each camp, so the briefing 
about the experiences in the Bungo camp had to serve for peace-keepers 
who had to travel to Mavinga (Besenyő, et al, 2013, 132-133). Despite this, 
employing returning officers as instructors had considerable advantages. The 
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Operation Coordinating Center, which took over the tasks of peace-training 
after the HDF Peace-force Training Center was disbanded, tried to use more 
practical experience in the preparation. Of course, such military skills as radio 
communications, map reading and land navigation, driving, marksmanship, 
and survival were part of the training. Most of the soldiers already possessed 
these skills at an acceptable level. In most cases, the aim was to refresh their 
knowledge as well as to learn different UN process. 24
Organizational experience (confirmed by individual recollections) shows that 
the preparation could not be 100 percent unless the training program draws on 
the experience gained in the field. The prime minister could declare that the 
contingent sent abroad was prepared for any eventuality – but that was only 
to ease public concern about the safety of the deploying soldiers. In reality, 
life produces new and unexpected situations – all the more so, because the 
HDF had no models to follow, and the soldiers on the spot had to resolve the 
unexpected challenges as best they could under the circumstances.
The equipment of the peace-keepers:
In the beginning the officers sent to Angola were issued many items of clothing 
and equipment that were useful in cold or temperate zones, but not in a tropical 
environment, due to the lack of experience. But this was discovered only when they 
were already in the field. For instance the 70M fatigue-uniform and the 70M boots in 
use at the time were clearly useless in the tropical environment. Several participants 
mentioned that the sole of the boot simply separated due to the frequent rains. Many 
people got serious foot infections and fungus due to the lack of ventilation. Many 
bought jungle boots from other peacekeepers or purchased shoes that were more 
appropriate in the Angolan environment from local shops. However, sometimes they 
also drove the patrol-vehicles in sandals or slippers (Besenyő, 2013/a, 241-242). The 
sleeping bag was practical in -15 or -20 degrees Centigrade, but no one use it in 
+40 degrees. Another example was the sunglasses issued to the observers. They were 
so dark that no one could see through them, they did not filter UV radiation. Using 
them was more dangerous for the eyes than going without eye protection. The issue 
duffle bag was very practical during travel, but it was less so for everyday use in 
the field:  (its contents were accessible only through a narrow opening at the top). A 
footlocker, adapted to the “mission wardrobe” would have been far more practical.
24 Despite of this tendency, there was a case when a Hungarian soldier was unable to drive a land rover, got from 
UN. The simply explanation of the event was that he only drove Trabant car at home. Because he could not 
succeed the requirements of the driving test so he was sent back. 
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Aside from the above shortcomings, the equipment was generally suitable for 
the requirements of the situation. Moreover, certain items (e.g. underwear, socks 
etc.) were issued in larger quantity than needed. Of course, there were some 
items that were superior to those of other nations. The insect screen proved 
to be particularly good. It was produced by the Clothing Supplying Center 
according to its own design, and it was suitable for an approximately 3–3,5 
sq meter “canopy bed”. Other nations envied the Hungarians for this. The is-
sued equipment also contained a medical kit provided by the medical corps. It 
included those instruments (all up to date), that would be useful in the field.
The activity of the peace-keepers
After UN training and examinations, the Hungarian soldiers went to various 
camps according to a schedule determined partly by an equal rotation principle 
and partly by the influence a particular nation had. The year was divided into 
for four three-month periods, and the participants had to serve in a different 
camp in each period. This rotation schedule was necessary because the camps 
were classified as category A, B or C. Category “A” camps were “first class:” 
the cities where infrastructure existed and everything was available. Category 
“B” camps were near functioning towns and villages, where everyday life was 
much harder. Category “C” camps were located in the most remote areas – desert 
or jungle – without any kind of infrastructure. Here the soldiers served isolated 
from the world and had to live in grass huts or tents, and their only connection 
to the outside world was by radio. The rotation schedule ensured that everyone 
would spend some time in each category during his tour (Besenyő, et al, 2013, 
108). The Hungarian officers had a serious advantage: most of them spoke 
Russian, so they were placed at the better supplied district-commands where 
they served as liaison to the Russian and Ukrainian staff of the UN transport 
helicopters (Besenyő, et al, 2013, 134). However, the others begun their tour 
in category “C” camps, often in very difficult circumstances. 25
The peacekeepers performed classic observer tasks. Their main functions were to 
monitor the parties in the confrontation, checking and recording their numbers and 
arms, documenting and reporting their findings (Besenyő 2013/a, 245). Later they 
participated in the disarmament of the parties, in the collection of arms, in escorting 
25 Most participants of UNAVEM-II lived in grass huts like the natives, because the UN didn’t built up its own 
bases. The working and living conditions improved by the end of UNAVEM-II, when UN repaired and furnished 
houses, abandoned by the Portuguese and damaged during the war (these served both as workplaces and living 
quarters ). In the latter operations (UNAVEM-III and MONUA), billeting conditions improved as containers and 
tents were put up in the camps.
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convoys and in the supervision of parliamentary elections. In addition, they monitored 
the various cease-fire violations, when armed clashed erupted between the executio-
ners of demobilizing. Their daily activity also included housekeeping work in camp: 
organizing everyday life, cooking, cleaning, fetching water, washing etc., that needed 
considerable time. Several people told me that obtaining food was a serious problem 
in the remote camps. They had to buy everything on their own salary and they could 
count upon only themselves. However, money was of no use when they could not 
find enough food in adequate quantity and of acceptable quality. They could not just 
go to the market and buy everything in one place. Several times they had to buy 
the ingredients for dinner in six villages. On some occasions the peacekeepers did 
not eat a real meal for weeks and subsisted on a vegetable dish made from roots, 
cabbage and some unknown plants and fruits (Besenyő, et al, 2013, 144). At the 
headquarters in the largest cities the situation was better, but the Hungarian soldiers 
faced various supplying problems there as well. They tried to overcome these with 
special methods. Every Hungarian checked in on the mission radio net at a prearranged 
time, when they could talk freely. On these occasions those serving in the remote 
areas dictated their requests for envelopes, stamps, soap, mineral water, chocolate, 
and other items they could not get locally to those in the Luanda headquarters. The 
latter consolidated the requests, bought the provisions and sent them by helicopter the 
following week or perhaps two weeks later. The residents of the camps would then 
send the money for the supplies with the return flight. The reliability of this system 
was proved by the fact that no one knew a case when there was an argument about 
payment. Everyone met their debts fairly (Besenyő, 2013/a, 246-247).
Hungarian soldiers often had to deal with unforeseen, and many times dangerous, 
situations, created by the instability of the country and the mission requirements. On 
one occasion the originally planned rotation had to be extended by more than two 
months for five Hungarian peacekeepers. This request was granted by the HDF and 
accepted by the soldiers, after some arm-twisting by the UN headquarters in New 
York (Hungarian National Archives, XIX-J-1-j, ENSZ BT, 1991, 003159 Relief of 
Hungarian peacekeepers in UNAVEM). Another time an Angolan policeman wanted to 
shoot a Hungarian soldier for turning the moot question (Besenyő, 2013/a, 223-224). 
Others were mistreated by UNITA fighters when clashes broke out again in 1993. 
On another occasion they were robbed. Despite these emergencies, no Hungarian 
soldier abandoned his post. They worked until their withdrawal. As his camp was 
being closed down, one officer took the time to rescue some nuns who had stayed 
behind in life threatening circumstances (Besenyő, et al, 2013, 141). Another one 
unknowingly drove his jeep for months over mines with defective detonators that 
had been planted in the road used by peacekeepers. If he had driven over them with 
a truck he could have “gone to dine with Saint Peter,” according to the leader of the 
bomb-disposal squad (Besenyő, 2013/a, 324). Wartime conditions, the monitoring of 
armed conflict, the sight of casualties, death, blood and destruction elicit unexpected 
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reactions from people. The Hungarian peace-keepers did not lose their head and 
executed their tasks scrupulously, many times risking their own lives. 26 Of course, 
everyone was fully aware of the fact that such duties could lead to tragedy. They 
realized it and accepted the risks.
It was a serious challenge to the peacekeepers to remain neutral in accordance 
with UN principles. According to research and my own experience, sooner or 
later the peace-keepers developed positive or negative attitudes towards the 
inhabitants as well as the opposing sides during the operations. However, our 
soldiers did not show this to the outside world. Several documents prove that 
the opposing sides never questioned the impartiality of Hungarian peacekeepers, 
and always considered them neutrals (Hungarian National Archives, XIX-J-1-j, 
Angola, 1992, 001325 Report on Hungarian-Angolan relationship).
Keeping contact with the family also affected the mental condition of the peacekee-
pers. They maintained contact mainly through letters, which usually took eight 
weeks. There was ere no telephone in the field, so the Hungarian soldiers could call 
home only when they went to Luanda for something. There was a telephone box 
at the headquarters, where they could initiate the call and pay for it on the spot, 
or have the charges deducted from their salary. Although there was a Hungarian 
embassy in the country, it provided only limited help for the soldiers, due to the 
continuously cut-backs and steadily deteriorating security conditions (Hungarian 
National Archives, XIX-J-1-j, Angola, 1992, 0085 Hungarian-Angolan military 
cooperation). Even this limited support ceased when the embassy was evacua-
ted, due to renewed fighting after the unsuccessful elections in 1992 (Hungarian 
National Archives, XIX-J-1-j, Angola, 1992, 002913 Angolan election 1992 and 
temporary closing of the Hungarian Embassy). The embassy was re-opened with a 
reduced staff in 1993, but it was permanently closed in the same year as a result 
of a government decision. 27  
26 A Hungarian officer told me that he got into dangerous situations several times when he negotiated with the leaders of 
anti-government groups, who seriously threatened him. The situation deteriorated to such an extent that he believed he 
would be killed. The most he could do was to keep the talk switch of the radio secretly pressed down. His comrades, 
who had remained at the base camp, heard everything that happened with him and his companions. This officer served 
seven months in the southern part of the country, called the “Death-zone” by the UN soldiers, where only robbers, 
other armed groups and peace-keepers lived among the belligerents. – Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (retired) 
István Solti, December 2010.
27 According to the final report of the embassy: “Also proved to be positive element the Hungarian military observers 
continuously presence in UNAVEM-II mission when certain countries withdrew their representatives, as the conflict 
deteriorated … The concerned Angolan sites appreciated highly our involvement in UNAVEM-II mission. The Hun-
garian military observers seized prestige in the international strength with their commitment in critical situations.” 
Hungarian National Archives, XIX-J-1-j, Angola, 1993, 4310 closing the Hungarian Embassy in Luanda Otherwise, 
several member of the Foreign Ministry didn’t agree with the closure of Angolan and other African embassies. Dr. 
Tamás Horváth, ambassador in Alger, drafted the follows in relation with this: “The amputation of our external repre-
sentative system will render more difficult our move in the future and the resurrection of previous relations … In the 
case of our country, it would be not favored to give up our seized positions and relations in Africa despite our financial 
problems.” - Hungarian National Archives, XIX-J-1-j, Afrika, 1994, 00160 Hungarian policy in Africa
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In that year many Hungarian soldiers were withdrawn from the operation because 
the UN could not guarantee their safety (Besenyő, 2013/a, 306-307). The UN tried 
to create peace for two further years but the mandate of UNAVEM-II was terminated 
in February 1995 due to the steadily deteriorating security situation. They created 
UNAVEM-III with a stronger mandate and the MONUA operation two years later. To 
these missions Hungary delegated fewer personnel the previously (Hungarian National 
Archives, XIX-J-1-j, Angola, 1995, 00779 perspectives of the Angolan Peace Plan). 28
The Hungarian involvement in Angola ceased when MONUA permanently left 
the country after a modest ceremony on 20 March 1999. MONUA withdrew at 
the request of the Luanda government, because clashes erupted again between 
the Angolan authorities and the Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA guerrilla-organization in 
December 1998. This time UNITA’s offensive was bloodier and more intensive 
than in the past. As result MONUA was unable to carry out its tasks in the areas 
occupied by UNITA units. The Luanda leadership therefore requested termination 
of the UN mission (James and Broadhead, 2004, 100). Several years had to elapse 
before the conflict would be successfully terminated. However, the peacekeepers 
did not return to the country after the withdrawal of MONUA.
The UN recognized the Hungarians’ highly professional performance and offered 
leadership positions to Hungary in the Ruanda–Uganda Border Controlling Mission 
(UNOMUR) and in the Liberian mission (UNOMIL) (Hungarian National Archives, 
XIX-J-1-j, Angola, 1993, 4310 Closing the Hungarian Embassy in Luanda). However, 
the Angolan operation was considered unimportant at home, perhaps due to the low 
membership of these missions. The experience gained was used to a limited extent 
only, mainly to train the new rotations for Angola. A significant proportion of the 
collected information was lost. Now, when peace-operations in Africa have again 
become a priority, it has again become important to analyze the experience gained in 
the Angolan and other peacekeeping missions, and apply it in training. The recently 
reestablished Scientific Research Center of the Hungarian Defence Force’s General 
Staff plays a leading role in this.
János Besenyő is a Lieutenant Colonel in the Training and Doctrinal Centre of the 
Hungarian Defence Forces. He has a MA in Zrínyi Miklós National Defence Uni-
versity (Defence Administration Manager) and a PhD in Military Science from the 
same university. He has served two times in Africa (Western-Sahara/MINURSO and 
Darfur /AMIS) and once in Afghanistan (ISAF). He is currently making research on 
28 Zsolt Maris, second secretary wrote the follows about the starting of the operation at our Pretorian embassy in 
May 1995: “Probably UNAVEM-III will be the most important and expensive UN mission in 1995 and 1996. The 
leadership of the global organization want to live down on its prestige caused the failure of the previous action 
with a large action never seen before.”
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African peacekeeping missions, and the effect of Arab Spring on the Security archi-
tects. He is a member of the editorial board of Hungarian Military Review, Hungarian 
African Studies and Art of War. Lt. Col Janos Besenyő participates occasionally in 
national and international seminars and regularly publishes articles in journals on 
the subject of security questions of Africa. He is a lecturer in various Collage’s and 
Universities (Military and Civilian) and member of the European Expert Network 
on Terrorism Issues (EENET).
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